The Changing Shape of the Defense Industry and Implications for Defense Acquisitions and Policy by Greenfield, Victoria A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2008-04-01
The Changing Shape of the Defense




1The Changing Shape of the Defense Industry and 
Implications for Defense Acquisitions and Policy
Work in Progress
Victoria A. Greenfield, Ph.D.
Crowe Chair Professor, U.S. Naval Academy
2Table of Contents
¾ Introduction
• Trends in Consolidation
• Possible Explanations
• Implications for Defense Acquisitions
• Conclusions and Future Research
3Wave of Consolidation Hits Defense 
Industry in 1990s
• Cold War ends… less defense spending
• Top-tier and other defense firms merge
– Lockheed and Martin Marietta
– Boeing and McDonnell Douglas
• DOD provides institutional and some financial 
support  for mergers




4Source: Chao (2005), citing others
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The “Eye Chart” Provides One Perspective
5Research Goals
• Establish statistical facts
– How has consolidation reshaped the defense industry?
– How might it continue to reshape the industry?
– What forces have promoted it?
• Consider implications for defense acquisitions 
using standard economic models and tools
– Concentration and competition
– Concentration, productivity, and innovation
6Approach
• Define defense industry in terms of DOD “market”
and suppliers of goods and services
• Draw data from DD350, DOD top 100 company 
reports, budget documents, DOL, DOC/BEA, 
FactSet Mergerstat, and AIA to establish facts and 
assess implications, using
– Descriptive statistics
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• Conclusions and Future Research
8Data Sources and Use
• Mergerstat data show broad trends
• DD350 collects data on DOD contract actions
– Can sort prime contracts and tally dollars by “Ultimate Parent 
Company” for 1984-2006 and supplement with “pre-
digested” data from top-100 reports for 1958-1983
• Rankings allow firm-level comparisons
• 4-, 8-, 20-, 50-, and 100-firm industry CRs
– indicate (proxy) consolidation
– allow market-level and cross-industry comparisons
– Changes in reporting methods and criteria, especially 
thresholds, pose substantial challenges
9M&As Economy Wide and in Aerospace Defense





























































































CRs Suggest Differences Across and 
Within Defense Industry Levels
• 4- and 8-firm CRs move together
• 50- and 100-firm CRs also move together
• 4/8- and 50/100-firm CRs do not move 
together uniformly (e.g., 1990s v. 2000s)
• 20-firm CR acts as “pivot”
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4- and 8-Firm CRs Move Together









































4/8- and 50/100-Firm CRs Do Not Move 
Together Uniformly












































Alternative Data Presentations Shed 
Light on Market-Level Differences
• Market-level breakouts, i.e., 1-4, 5-8, 9-20, 
21-50, and 51-100-firms, set top 4 apart.
• Comparisons of equally-ranked firms over 
time show transition at top-most levels and 
consequences for other levels
– Firms 1-4 gain market share
– Firms 5-8 and 9-20 lose market share
– Firms 21-50 converge to “business as usual”
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Source: Author based on data from DOD DD350 and top 100 reports (1958-2006).
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Comparisons of Equally Ranked Firms 
Show Transitions





























































Observations consistent with hollowing 
out of “5-to-20” market
(Good, bad, indifferent?)
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What Drives Consolidation?
• Changes in DOD Spending
– Declining expenditures in 1990s
• End of cold war
• Mounting federal deficits
– Increasing expenditures in 2000s (Iraq)
• DOD policy decisions and interventions
• Conditions in larger economy
Given prominence of DOD as purchaser, market forces 
and policy actions not clearly separable
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Defense-Spending Cycles











































































Industry Concentration v. Spending
Source: Author based on data from the DOD Green Book (2007 and 2008), 























































Results Support Multiple Factors
23
DOD Influences but Does not Control 
Defense Industry
• Autoregressive “Black Box” explains most of 
the variation in 4-firm CR, but…
• Defense budgets and economy-wide 
conditions matter too, while…
• DOD policy actions—e.g., the “Last 
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Concentration and Competition
• Preliminary assessment of “Extent of Competition” in 
DD350 for 1989-1994, 1999, and 2004 yields 
inconclusive results
– Competition decreases among the very top-most firms, in 
aggregate, i.e. top 4
• Competitive share drops from 61% to 48%
– Competition has not increased—or decreased—uniformly at 
other market levels or even among top 4
– Correlation between concentration and competition is +/- at 
different market levels
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Concentration, Productivity, and Innovation
• Cursory look at data on labor productivity and R&D 
suggests areas of concern
– Correlation between aircraft labor productivity and 4-firm CR 
is negative, after accounting for rise in manufacturing 
productivity
– Correlation between company-funded applied R&D and 4-
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Conclusions
• In some sense, the “eye chart” is right
– The top 4 firms, in aggregate, have become more 
concentrated and less competitive since the 1990s, albeit 
with a modest reversal post-2003
• But, the eye chart tells only part of the story
– Differences across/within market levels, even within top 4
– Market dynamism, including new, global entrants
– Competition, productivity, and innovation?
• Moreover, DOD may have less control than it thinks
– The Black Box suggests potential for additional consolidation 
in the not-too-distant future
29
Future Research
• Address structural breaks in time series
• Flesh out competition model, data, and results
• Pursue interest in relationship between competition, 
productivity, and innovation, especially innovation
– Using R&D and patent data
– Conducting cross-industry comparisons
– Controlling for other economic forces
• Consider feasibility of analysis by product lines
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Summary of Regression Results
• If BA decreases by one billion dollars in one year, CR4F 
increases by about 0.00009 in next year
– Actual decrease in real BA in 2005 would have been associated 
with increase of about 0.0002 in CR4F in 2006*
• If economy-wide M&As increase by 1 in one year, CR4F 
increases by about 2.52E-06 in same year
– Actual increase in economy-wide M&As in 2006, would have been 
associated with increase of about 0.002 in CR4F in 2006*
• Lagged industry concentration and economy-wide M&As
are significantly correlated, but collinearity neither 
eliminates statistical significance nor confounds signage
























• The “simple market model”
– Static bilateral monopoly
• Prices higher*
• Quantity indeterminant*
• Net surplus indeterminant*
– Bilateral monopoly with 
economies of scale
• Preliminary assessment of 
DD350 data on “Extent of 
Competition”…
Consolidation and Competition
*Compared with pure monopsony or quasi-monopsony
35
Preliminary Data Assessment
• DD350 reports on “Extent of Competition” for 
each award from 1989*-2006
– A = “Competed”
– C = “Follow on to Competed Action”
• Can tally sum of dollars awarded “A” or “C”
for each ultimate parent company
– Share of DOD contract dollars competitively 
awarded, direct or indirectly, provides measure of 
competition for firms and industry
*Data are available for 1988, but may be inconsistently coded.
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Is the Market Less—or More—
Competitive?
• Competition has decreased among the very 
top-most firms, in aggregate, i.e., the top 4
– Competitive share in 1989 = about 61%
– Competitive share in 2004 = about 48%
• Competition has not decreased—or  
increased—uniformly at other market levels…
• Or even among the top 1-4
– the first-ranked firm was more competitive in 2004 
(55% “A” or “C”) than in 1989 (49% “A” or “C”)
37
How Does Competition Relate to 
Concentration?
• Correlations between competition and concentration do 
not tell a consistent story across or within market levels
 Top 4 Top 8 Top 20 Top 50 Top 100
-0.5599 -0.3211 0.5675 0.8261 0.7834
Top 1-4 Top 5-8 Top 9-20 Top 21-50Top 51-100 101+
-0.5599 0.4420 -0.4021 0.0027 0.5513 0.0890
*
*The correlation is positive for the first-ranked firm.
38
Consolidation, Productivity, and 
Innovation
• If industry is more consolidated, hence less 
competitive, will it also become less 
productive and less innovative?
• Less competition may imply
– Less incentive to raise productivity/innovate
– More resources to raise productivity/innovate
• And some incentive to preserve market position
Has industry, particularly at the top-most levels, 
become less productive or innovative?
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Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
But… the partial correlation between aircraft labor productivity and the 4-firm 
concentration ratio, after controlling for the contemporaneous rise in 
manufacturing labor productivity, is actually -0.572 and moderately significant
41
Innovation and Industry Concentration
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Cor(AR&D,CR4F) = -0.73
